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This Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari

is

submitted

by

Applicant/Respondent,

Gary

E.

Crosland, who urges this Court not to accept Certiorari in this
case.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Respondent

does

not

dispute

that

this

Court

has

jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution;
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3) and (5) (1989); and Rule
45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The fact that this
Court has jurisdiction to entertain this Writ does not, however,
mean that it should or must.

Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure makes clear that "Review by a writ of
certiorari

is

not

a

matter

of

right,

but

of

judicial

discretion...."
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Utah

Code Annotated,

controlling statute.

Section

35-1-66

(1988)

is the

Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure is the controlling Rule containing the considerations
governing

review

by

Writ

of

Certiorari.

There

was

no

controlling definition of the phrase "prior impairment" at the
time governed by the facts of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent does not dispute the Statement of the Case
contained in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent
contained

does

not

dispute

the

Statement

of

Facts

in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the

exception that it must be underscored that the industrial injury
which Mr. Crosland suffered on February 9, 1989, aggravated and
made symptomatic a previously non-ratable, asymptomatic medical
condition.
Dr. Robert H. Home, Mr. Crosland7s treating physician, in
a report dated September 28, 1989, stated that although Mr.
Crosland had a pre-existing spondylolisthesis, the industrial
injury caused the pre-existing spondylotytic defect to become
acute and symptomatic. (R. at 59).
On September 19, 1989, Dr. John F. Lilly, a physician for
the carrier, examined Mr. Crosland and indicated that in his
opinion

Mr.

Crosland

spondylolisthesis

had

prior

to

asymptomatic
the

spondylolysis

industrial

injury;

and
and,

significantly, that all of the symptoms suffered by Mr. Crosland
were occasioned by the occurrence of the industrial injury. (R.
at 59).
Following the hearing, this matter was referred to a
Medical Panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge which
reported its conclusions on May 8, 1990, including the finding
that Mr. Crosland had a 20% permanent, partial impairment of the
whole body, attributing 10% to the industrial accident and 10%
to "pre-existing conditions."

(R. Vol. II at 194).

It also

concluded that the industrial accident aggravated Mr. Crosland's
"pre-existing condition."

(R. Vol. II at 184).
2

Significantly,

it further commented as follows:
a. It is the panel's position that the Applicant did
probably have a developmental abnormality which had
been asymptomatic up to the point of onset of symptoms
from the twisting, lifting [industrial] injury. It is
entirely possible he could have gone on for an
indefinite period had it not been for the event
described.... [Emphasis added] (R. Vol II at 182).
b. The industrial injury did medically aggravate a
pre-existing condition of the Applicant. Comment: As
indicated previously, this was an asymptomatic
condition, but an abnormal status was present to a
sufficient degree to be contributory to his present
impaired status. [Emphasis added] (R. Vol II at 184185) .
The Order of the Administrative Law Judge of August 14,
1990 adopted the Medical Panel Report and awarded compensation
benefits to Mr. Crosland, but limited them to the 10% whole body
permanent, partial impairment exclusively attributable to the
industrial accident. She denied benefits for the additional 10%
whole body permanent, partial impairment attributable to the
asymptomatic, non-ratable condition which was aggravated and
made symptomatic by the industrial accident (R. at 76-77).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court should not accept Certiorari in this
case.

The Utah Court of Appeals has been the Court of last

resort in Workers Compensation matters for many years, and
although review of a Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is
available by way of Writ of Certiorari, such review should be
strictly limited and only granted in the most important matters
in order to maintain the integrity of the Utah Court of Appeals
and promote judicial economy.

3

The decision below, from which review is sought is also a
very narrow one spanning a period between 1988 and 1991.
Utah

Court

of Appeals

recognized

that

in

The

1991, the Utah

Legislature amended the Worker's Compensation Act to precisely
define the term "impairment" by statute which was not the case
when Mr. Crosland was injured.

The decision below is strictly

limited to those injuries occurring between 1988 and 1991 and in
all likelihood constitutes law of the case only.
And finally, the Decision below by the Utah Court of
Appeals (which was unanimous) is a correct one.

A cursory

reading of it will confirm its reasonableness and logic.

A R G U M E N T
THIS
COURT
SHOULD NOT
EXERCISE
ITS
DISCRETION TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS MATTER.
A. A PANEL OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS NOT RENDERED
A DECISION IN CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF ANOTHER PANEL OF THE
COURT ON THE SAME ISSUE OF LAW, AS SPECIFIED UNDER RULE 46(A) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Petitioners allege that the decisions of different panels
of the Utah Court of Appeals in the cases of Crosland v. Board
of Review, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (March 20, 1992) and Nvrehn v.
Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) are in
conflict and that such conflict warrants review by this Court
pursuant to Rule 46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
This alleged conflict arises, as Petitioners read Nvrehn to
require

apportionment

of

permanent,

total

disability

compensation between asymptomatic, pre-existing conditions and

4

the industrial injury, while they allege that Crosland stands
for the proposition that there is no apportionment.

In so

arguing, Petitioners misinterpret the true holdings in each of
those cases.
As Respondent argued before the Court of Appeals, the sole
issue

in Nyrehn was whether

the claimant

had

suffered a

compensable injury and could prove legal causation under the
rule announced in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986).

The issue of any apportionment of the claimants

disability between pre-existing incapacity and the industrial
injury was neither briefed nor argued by any of the parties in
that case.
The holding of Nyrehn is that "when an accident is the
climax of repeated exertions, as in Nyrehn's case, work-related
'exertion7, for purpose of proving legal causation, is the
aggregate exertion of the repetitive exertions that establish
the accident."

Id. at 336. The Court's cursory statement that

"...the case is remanded with instructions to grant Nyrehn
benefits for total permanent disability as calculated by the
Administrative Law Judge" [Id. at 337] did not judicially adopt
an apportionment rule in workers compensation cases.
While it is true that the Petitioner in Nyrehn also had an
asymptomatic pre-existing condition of spondylolysis and that
the Medical

Panel

apportioned

75% of her

total permanent

impairment to the industrial accident and 25% to a pre-existing
incapacity, she was awarded permanent, total disability benefits
without an offset for her pre-existing asymptomatic condition.
5

The apportionment specified

in that case was for the

purpose of allocating the liability for payments between the
employer and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
Second Injury Fund).
involve any

Crosland, on the other hand, did not

issue as to apportionment with

Reinsurance Fund.

(formerly the

the

Employers

The "apportionment" issue discussed in those

two cases was not on the "same issue of law" as that phrase is
used in Rule 46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. As
the Utah Court of Appeals noted in Crosland:
This reliance is misplaced because the Nyrehn case
merely apportions between the employer and the fund
under this section and does not address the issue of
apportionment between the employer and the employee.
Id. at 38, footnote 6.
Nyrehn received the full value of her disability with no
reduction for pre-existing injury.

She, like Mr. Crosland, had

an asymptomatic, pre-existing condition of spondylolysis.

Her

Medical Panel found that 75% of her permanent impairment was due
to the industrial accident while 25% was due to pre-existing
conditions.

Nevertheless, she received

100% compensation,

including the 25% prior asymptomatic condition which only became
symptomatic by reason of the industrial injury.
If Nyrehn stands for any relevant proposition in this case,
it is that the worker is not penalized for the aggravation of an
asymptomatic pre-existing injury which only becomes symptomatic
by reason of an industrial accident. Nyrehn is not an authority
by which a claimant's award can be reduced by the degree of
disability which can be apportioned to an asymptomatic preexisting injury.
6

Not only is there no conflict between Crosland and Nyrehn,
but, in fact, as Respondent successfully argued to the Utah
Court of Appeals, Nyrehn is actually persuasive authority for
the proposition that in workers compensation matters one does
not apportion between the employer and the employee, but only in
appropriate

cases

between

the

employer

and

the

Employers

Reinsurance Fund, pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated,

Section

35-1-69

(1988).

McPhie

v.

Industrial

Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977).
There is no conflict in the decisions of the Utah Court of
Appeals dealing with "apportionment."

Petitioners only seek to

create one by confusing the concepts of "apportionment" between
the employer and the employee and the statutory "apportionment"
between the employer and the Employers7 Reinsurance Fund that
arises pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69 (1988).
The Utah

Court of Appeals has recently

interpretation that is to be given that statute.

examined the
In Virgin v.

Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the Court
noted:
In 1988, Section 35-1-69 was repealed and a new
Section 35-1-69 was reenacted.
Under the current
version, the test for apportioning liability for
compensation requires at least a ten percent preexisting whole person permanent impairment with
additional impairment caused by accident from
employment resulting in permanent total disability
before liability for compensation is apportioned. Id.
footnote 5 at 1288.
There is no reasonable basis for asserting that there is
presently any confusion as to when and under what circumstances
"apportionment" applies in Utah workers compensation matters.
7

If there were, the Virgin case answers it.
B. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS NOT DECIDED A QUESTION OF
STATE LAW IN A WAY THAT CONFLICTS WITH A DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT, AS SPECIFIED UNDER RULE 46(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Petitioners allege that the Utah Court of Appeals decision
in Crosland is in conflict with this Courts rulings in Morton
Int'l., Inc. v. Auditing Division. 814 P. 2d 581 (Utah 1991) and
Holloway v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31 (Utah 1986).
Once again, Petitioners are guilty of misreading case law since
no conflict in fact exists. Since Morton and Holloway deal with
different issues of law they will be discussed separately.
1.

THE HOLDING IN CROSLAND DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH

MORTON,
In Morton this Court stated as follows:
Therefore, in cases dealing with statutory
construction, the Utah Administrative Procedure Act
does not change the standard of review when the Court
is in as good a position as the agency to determine
the issue or when the agency has been granted
discretion in interpreting the statute.
However,
nothing in the language of Section 63-46b-16 or its
legislative history suggests that an agency/s decision
is entitled to deference solely on the basis of agency
expertise or experience.
Indeed, there is no
reference to agency expertise or experience in the
statute or the statute's legislative history. Rather,
in granting judicial relief when an 'agency has
erroneously interpreted or applied the law,' the
language of Section 63-46b-16(4) clearly indicates
that absent a grant of discretion, a correction of
error standard is used in reviewing an agency's
interpretation or application of a statutory term.
Id. at 588.
The Court of Appeals in Crosland recognized this Court's
ruling in Morton by stating as follows:

8

This proceeding
is governed
^*
""he Utah
Administrative Procedures A c t (UAPA) , Utah -/ode Ann,.
Section 63-46b~l to-22 (1989 & Supp. 1991)
Section
63-46b-16(4) (d) governs the scope of our review of the
Industrial Commission's Order, allowing relief if
Crosland has been 'substantially prejudiced' because
'the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law.' In M o r t o n Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of t h e
Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 5 8 1 , 587-89 (Utah
1 9 9 1 ) , the Supreme Court held that under this section
w e may review for1 correctness and need not defer to
tin! agency's interpretation unless there is "a grant
of discretion to the agency concerning the language in
question, either expressly m a d e in the statute or
implied from the statutory language.
Id. at 589.
W h e n legislative intent can be discerned, howevex we
give the agency's interpretation, no deference. Id.;
accord Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board of Review, 166 Utah
Adv. R e p . 17 (Utah A p p . 1 9 9 1 ) . This case requires an
interpretation of the 1988 amendment to the W o r k e r s '
Compensation Act and thus presents a question of
statutory construction and legislative intent which w e
may review for correctness.
Under this higher
;• standard, to afford relief w e m u s t find that the
Commission
erroneously
interpreted
the
law
to
Crosland's substantial prejudice, (Footnotes omi"-f.e ;: I
Id. at 36.
'i 11<

'ii i t
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•

in

Hyiiehjn

iii,rM» ,n^

impairment '*"

In ( m i ,

the exception of

those governing appeals.
2.

THE HOLDING IN CROSLAND DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH

HOLLOWAY.
The sole issue on appeal in Holloway was whether his injury
was the result of an "accident" as that term is used in the
Workmen's Compensation Act. This Court noted that the case was
controlled

by

Commission,

its prior

729

P. 2d

15

decision
(Utah

in Allen

1986) and

v.

Industrial

remanded

to the

Commission for reconsideration in light of Allen.
Petitioners place great reliance on the concurring opinion
of Justices Zimmermann and Howe:
The sole question is whether the worker came to the
workplace with a condition that increased his risk of
injury. If he did and that condition contributed to
the injury, then Allen's higher standard of legal
causation comes into play to place that worker on the
same footing as one who did not come to work with a
preexisting condition. See Id. at 25-26. To rule
otherwise would create the strong likelihood that a
worker who has a pre-existing condition and whose
virtually inevitable injury simply happens to occur at
work will be able to foist the cost of that injury on
his employer when the workplace had little to do with
causing the injury. (Emphasis added) Id. at 32.
Without addressing whether a concurring opinion states
sufficient precedent to create a sufficient conflict to warrant
review by Writ of Certiorari as required by Rule 46(b) of the
Utah Rules

of Appellate

Procedure,

it

is clear

that the

conditions referred to in Holloway simply do not apply in
Crosland.

Even if the higher standard of legal causation set

forth in Allen applies, Petitioners do not allege that Crosland
would

be

unable

to

show

that

the

employment

contributed

something substantial to the risk he already faced in everyday
10
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(Crosland)
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USUAL C O U R S E O F JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS A S T O CALL FOR A N
E X E R C I S E O F T H E SUPREME COURT'S POWER O F SUPERVISION,
A S S P E C I F I E D UNDER RULE 46(C) — ™ T ™ " T A H RULES O F
APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Tti!"» e s s e n c e of P e t i t i o n e r s ' a r g u m e n t h e r e is that tb<=> c •;. t
of

Appedls

accepted

in, L'rubldiid . uuic u n w e d

,i "sweeping change*

:he

a n d u s u a l c o u r s e of claims tiefore i \w < "ommi s s i o n H .

/viii l e u : 1 ; „i i I i f (ft

i hat: :

l"lhe final decision w i n have a significant impact on
not only the amount of compensation injured employees
may receive, but may also significantly affect the
premiums employers will have to pay to provide workers
compensation insurance coverage.
The decision may
also significant!\ impact ^he costs of providing
compensation be.nef i t •- f
* h,v^p employers which
Ii

qualify as self-insureds" (Brief of Amicus Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah at 9-10).
Once again Petitioners, in an attempt to find an accepted
basis for a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, have misstated the
holding and implications of the Utah Court of Appeal's decision
in Crosland. Crosland did not announce any "sweeping change" in
the law concerning pre-existing injuries, but rather followed an
existing body of law.
Crosland only stands for the proposition that under 1988 1991

law, the aggravation

of a pre-existing,

asymptomatic

condition is compensable since there is no apportionment of
liability as between the employer and the employee* for symptoms
resulting from the industrial accident.

That holding is in

conformance with a long line of prior decisions of this Court.
See Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984),
Johnson v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1982),
reh'g granted, 660 P.2d 244 (Utah 1983), Nuzum v. Roosendahl
Constr. & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977), and Tintic
Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278
(Utah 1922) .
In addition, Professor Larson in his oft-cited treatise on
Workmens Compensation speaks directly to this point when he
states:
Nothing is better established in compensation law than
the rule that, when industrial injury precipitates
disability from a latent prior condition,... the
entire disability is compensable,... No attempt is
made to weigh the relative contribution of the
accident and the pre-existing condition to the final
disability or death. Apportionment does not apply in
such cases, nor in any case in which the prior
12
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D.
THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IN
CROSLAND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF
STATE LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN BUT SHOULD BE SETTLED BY
THIS COURT, AS SPECIFIED UNDER RULE 46(D) OF THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
In their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petitioners
argue:

"... that the Crosland opinion is an issue of first

impression to this Court and vitally affects all Utah employers
and employees."

(Petition for Writ of Certiorari, page 16.)

This vague attempt to qualify under Rule 46(d) is not fully
developed by either Petitioners or Amicus. No new arguments are
advanced in order to establish a basis for review under this
subsection; rather, Petitioner and Amicus merely rehash their
prior arguments.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals has been historically the Court of
last resort in Workers Compensation matters. This Court should
not exercise its discretion to grant a Writ of Certiorari except
in the most significant matters.

Petitioners and Amicus have

wholly failed to satisfy any of the bases provided in Rule 46 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, indicating the "character
of reasons that will be considered" in a decision to accept
review by way of a Writ of Certiorari.
The

decision

in

Crosland

was

a

proper,

logical

and

reasonable interpretation of the law as it existed at the time
Mr. Crosland was injured.

The 1991 definitions were not in

effect at the time of Mr. Crosland's industrial injury, and the
legislature did not make them retroactive and neither should
this Court.
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Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court
enter an ondei uunyiM' i n *

i'l.'i

i i ' i i i IN if nf rertinrari and

allow the decision ot the Utah C o m I uf Appeais In SIHIII
DAT Fl» this iilii day oi Ju.!"

1992.__

&
VIRGINTqS
DABNEY, ESQ.
Attorneys for Applicant/Respondent
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